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How Solving a Dopamine Puzzle Might Resolve the Paradox of Painful Art (upcoming)
Abstract: Aesthetic hedonism, the view that the value of an artwork is determined by its pleasure-inducing properties, is largely regarded as the default theory of aesthetic value. However, aesthetic hedonism has significant challenges as well. One notable challenge points to the high value we ascribe to some works of art that arouse negative or unpleasant sensations, like Picasso’s Guernica. Relatedly, the paradox of painful art points out that some of us seek out art that evokes unpleasant sensations yet avoid unpleasant sensations in real life. If this claim is correct, then it appears that aesthetic hedonism is false. With this project, I draw a parallel between the paradox of painful art and a neurobiological puzzle (the cocaine puzzle), which asks how cocaine induces hedonic sensations even though it does not directly activate hedonic neural mechanisms. I ultimately demonstrate that the neural mechanisms that can resolve the cocaine puzzle can also resolve the paradox of painful art. Importantly, this response to the paradox of painful art also defends aesthetic hedonism since it highlights underlying hedonic mechanisms that become active even in the face of painful art. On Stochastic Picassos and Why VLMs Cannot Replace Artists, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (upcoming)
Vision Language Models (VLMs), like DALL-E, Midjourney, and Stable Diffusion, have raised significant concerns regarding authorship and whether AI-generated images devalue artistic practices and traditions. Recently, some have argued that VLMs should be viewed as another tool that artists use to generate their creative outputs. I defend this position and expand on it by introducing an account of agency that demonstrates that only biological agents, at least for now, possess the necessary powers to be responsible for the act of creation (e.g., the capacity to realize autonomous goal-directed actions and manipulate affordances). I will ultimately argue that although VLMs afford artists the ability to output high-quality images with minimal technical skill, creating artworks that are valued using VLMs will actually require significant ingenuity. Therefore, in my view, concerns that this new tool will blur the lines of authorship and undermine artistic practices and traditions are unwarranted. Painting with Zombies: Neuroaesthetics and the Teleological Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness, Global Philosophy 36, 3, (2026)
Abstract: One of the more pressing questions regarding phenomenal consciousness (or qualia) concerns its teleological function. For example, is there a purpose for having qualitative experiences when it seems at least conceivable to live as a zombie void of qualia or rich sensory experiences? In this paper, I will discuss recent findings in the emerging field of neuroaesthetics, which could form a novel framework for addressing what I will refer to as the teleological problem of phenomenal consciousness. While still in developmental stages, neuroaesthetics is moving beyond its early incarnations as a science that exclusively studies how the human brain responds to artworks, and into a science that studies how and, importantly, why we have sensory and qualitative experiences. I will ultimately argue that neuroaesthetics, when scaffolded by evolutionary principles, is poised to contribute empirically grounded responses to the teleological problem of phenomenal consciousness. Why Prosocial Octopuses Challenge the Autonomy of Psychological States, Synthese 206, 241, (2025)
Abstract: Researchers administered MDMA (known as ecstasy) to octopuses and observed their behavior. Due, at least in part, to serotonin transport systems nearly identical to human ones, octopuses on ecstasy behave in a prosocial manner. This observation suggests that neurochemicals, like serotonin, which are conserved across taxa, contribute to the realization of some psychological states. Since standard functionalism claims that not only can psychological states be multiply realized, but that psychological states are also autonomous from neural states, then this eccentric experiment reveals an important challenge. Using recent research in neuroscience and a mechanistic account of multiple realization, I argue that certain cases of multiply realized psychological states always include specific neurochemicals (i.e. neurotransmitters) and this undermines the kind of multiple realization that is needed to warrant autonomy. I conclude that the multiple realization of psychological states does not guarantee autonomy from neural states and that the functionalist claims for autonomy are not empirically justified. Art as Artifact: An Empirical Approach to Locating its Hedonic Function, Journal of Neurophilosophy, 4(2), (2025)
Abstract: Standard accounts of artifacts claim that they are objects purposefully designed by an agent (or agents) to realize a proper, or teleological, function. Artworks have often been regarded as functionless entities; thus, many have disqualified them from possessing artifact status. With this paper, I defend the view that artworks are, in fact, artifacts since they serve hedonic functions. In my view, declarations of the functionless nature of artworks stem from an epistemically impoverished position regarding neural responses to artworks. I introduce recent research from neuroaesthetics, the study of the neural underpinnings of aesthetic experiences, which demonstrates that artworks act as a catalyst that stimulates the neural reward circuitry, thereby producing heightened hedonic sensations. These hedonic sensations, I claim, are the function of artworks; art appreciators seek them out, and artists desire to induce them. |