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I work on philosophical issues that intersect with neuroscience, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and aesthetics. A central aspect of my work involves examining recent neuroscience research and applying these findings to various philosophical domains. A second element of my research engages with the metaphysical issues that underlie many scientific theories and concepts.
1. Philosophy, Neuroscience, and Artificial Minds The dominance of classical cognitive science, along with other computational approaches to the mind and cognition, has contributed to neuroscience’s diminished role as a significant contributor to philosophical discourse. However, recent challenges to various computational approaches to the mind, along with steady growth in the brain sciences, have helped to restore neuroscience as a viable contributor to philosophical inquiry. Much of my research, along with my dissertation, employs neuroscience research to help illuminate various philosophical problems. In “Why Prosocial Octopuses Challenge the Autonomy of Psychological States”, I introduce an eccentric experiment in which octopuses, like humans, became more prosocial when administered the narcotic ecstasy. This shared prosocial response to the drug is due to nearly identical serotonin systems between species. I argue that this experiment, along with others, undermine functionalist claims that psychological states are autonomous from neural states, since they highlight the vital contribution of conserved neurochemicals toward the realization of various psychological states. I further develop this argument by presenting four mechanistic sources of multiple realization and demonstrate that the source of multiple realization needed to warrant the autonomy of psychological states from neural states lacks empirical justification. The surge of artificial intelligence has dominated recent philosophical discourse. In particular, debates about whether large language models (LLMs) truly understand the words they employ has garnered significant attention. In “LLMs and the Problem of Uncommon Ground", I engage with research on embodied semantics and neurosemiotics, which reveals that the sensory-motor processes are active when we use or even think about particular words. I argue that this research, since it reveals that semantic knowledge is grounded in worldly interactions, justifies compatibility concerns regarding LLMs’ since their semantic knowledge is grounded in an artificial vector space. In a related paper, “LLMs, Plant Minds, and Why Multiple Realization is Not Enough”, I introduce research on plant biology and argue, via a reductio ad absurdum, that claims for LLMs having a folk psychology are not strong since many plants can meet that criterion as well. Overall, I claim that multiple realization arguments that warrant some kind of mental function to LLMs are not enough to satisfy whether they can meet mammalian standards of mental function. 2. Neuroaesthetics A significant area of my research includes exploring the philosophical questions that have emerged out of a young branch of cognitive neuroscience, neuroaesthetics. Neuroaesthetics is barely two decades old, yet within the last few years, it has produced fascinating results concerning how and why we respond to various stimuli. Initially, neuroaesthetics was dedicated to the study of neural responses to aesthetic objects (mostly art). Currently, neuroaesthetics embodies a more mature science that has moved away from the exclusive study of brains responding to artworks and into a science of sensory valuations and hedonics. In “Neuroaesthetics: A Primer for Philosophers”, I introduce neuroaesthetics research and highlight its relevance to philosophers who not only work on the mind and aesthetics but also those who work in the biological sciences, as well as moral and social issues. In my “Painting with Zombies: Neuroaesthetics and the Teleological Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness”, I demonstrate that neuroaesthetics is poised to respond to the challenge of locating a teleological function for phenomenal consciousness. This project highlights some of the important insights that neuroaesthetics has made regarding sensory valuations and hedonic functions. Building off of that paper, I produced “Reframing the Hard Problem of Consciousness as the Hard Problem of Aesthetic Experience”, in which I introduce empirical accounts of aesthetic experiences, developed by neuroaesthetics researchers, and argue that the sensory and evaluative properties typically attributed to phenomenal consciousness mirror these empirical accounts of aesthetic experiences. However, even though these concepts mirror one another, I ultimately argue for the replacement of phenomenal consciousness as a concept with this empirical account of aesthetic experience. I defend this replacement by pointing out that empirical accounts of aesthetic experience, contra phenomenal consciousness, can provide proximate and ultimate explanations for sensory phenomenal experiences, along with being able to locate their neural correlates. I have also developed projects that employ neuroaesthetics research to locate the neural mechanisms responsible for intersexual selection, establish the hedonic teleological function of artworks, and explain how painful art can still induce hedonic sensations. 3. The Metaphysics of Science and a New Mechanical Ontology Another strand of my research concerns the metaphysics of science and the development of a mechanistic ontology that expands upon the work of those referred to as new mechanists. This ontology includes developing mechanistic accounts of realization (including multiple realization) and emergence. While most new mechanists have focused on epistemological issues concerning the explanation and the discovery of mechanisms, I argue that mechanistic thinking, when expanded into an ontological program, can make significant metaphysical contributions as well. In “Expanding a New Mechanical Ontology: Objects as Functional Mechanisms”, I argue against the received view that mechanisms must actively bring about their phenomena. Rather, I claim that inactive objects (or artifacts) that have a capacity to realize a function can be mechanisms as well. This distinction is important since, in my view, accounting for objects (or artifacts) within a new mechanical ontology expands and clarifies the deep role mechanisms play within the causal and physical structure of the world. In addition, this mechanistic ontology has value when imported in traditional metaphysical problems, this includes issues concerning material constitution, the special composition question, and an account of determinism that leaves room for volition or free will. 4. Future Directions I intend to make neuroaesthetics and the neural mechanisms that drive sensory hedonic valuations a significant aspect of my future philosophical work. A philosophical account of aesthetic experiences and hedonics rooted in empirical data will not only be useful in attaining a greater understanding of human cognition, but it will also inform our assessment of the feasibility of artificial sentience—and how we might interact with them if it is ever achieved. In addition, I would like to incorporate research on situated cognition into future projects, since it is becoming apparent that in order to fully grasp biological cognition, the dynamic interplay between brains, bodies, and their environmental constraints must be considered. |